A surprising amount of services (including Azure last I tried) can only handle RSA keys, so after trying ecdsa only for a while I ended up adding a RSA key again.
With that said - it's 2023, in almost all cases you should have your keys in a hardware module nowadays, in which case you'd use a different command for keygeneration.
Actually it is the same story with TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2. A bunch of sites still doesn't support TLS 1.3 (e. g. arstechnica.com, startpage.com) and some of them only support TLS 1.2 with RSA (e. g. startpage.com).
You can try this yourself in Firefox by disabling ciphers (search for security.ssl3 in about:config) or by setting the minimum TLS version to 1.3 (security.tls.version.min = 4 in about:config).
Probably a good idea to look for a different client, call me tinfoil but I wouldn't want to touch a very old mechanism that is supported/pushed by a very recognisable 3 letter agency
Yes, it is.
ed25519 depends upon discrete log for its security, which Shor's algorithm can (theoretically, of course, not like it's ever been done) efficiently solve.
The post-quantum algorithms are in active research right now.
I don't blame anyone for avoiding those at least until we've quantum computers big enough to solve baby toy elliptic curves.
Yes, though OpenSSH has already switched to a quantum resistant algorithm for key exchange (Streamlined NTRU Prime, combined with x25519 in case SNTRUPrime turns out to be weak), and that's the stuff that needs to be switched as soon as possible to preserve forward secrecy. Authentication keys are less urgent.