Telegram will disclose users' phones and IP addresses to authorities at their requests, the messengers' founder and CEO Pavel Durov said on September 23.
And if they had implented that to begin with and used servers that kept no logs he wouldn't have had anything of value to hand over and they would have had to release him since he physically could not provide those things.
He built the damn situation for himself, and the fact that such issues weren't considered practically screams "honeypot."
Maybe we could say he wouldn’t be in this situation because he could’ve responded to every request his company got and they could’ve provided all of the zero logs they had.
I believe Telegram just wasn’t cooperating at all which is wild! Such a Musk thing to do.
Just keep in mind that any service that asks for a phone number can also disclose it.
I hope what leaves the Signal client is a hash of your phone number, rather than the number itself. They might even be using salts and expensive-to-execute key derivation functions, to mitigate brute force searches (which are otherwise easy given the relatively small search space of phone numbers). But if compelled, it would be trivial for Signal to change that behavior.
That is a pretty weak argument. The issues are minor and in a library that people are moving off of to a better build and stronger validated library. Yes, it should have been like that in the first place, but the problem is minor and being addressed.
I would look more to the various features of Matrix that aren't encrypted like room names, topics, reactions, ... and not to mention the oodles of unencrypted metadata. I really wouldn't call Matrix a high-privacy system.
I like Matrix and use it regularly, but it definitely doesn't have a privacy-first mindset like Signal does. I'm hoping that this improves over time, but without a strong privacy first leadership it seems unlikely to happen.
Olm is now deprecated and all development is now focused into Vodozemac: https://github.com/matrix-org/vodozemac. That being said, is there no proven Olm Protocol alternative implementation for e2e encryption (proven technology) instead of reinventing the wheel.
vodozemac might become that proven implementation. Without reinventing the wheel there will never be an alternative, because everyone just reuses the one existing library.
While it might be secure.. I'm done with centralized services.. If I can't host it myself, I won't bother switching anymore.
I don't know Simplex chat very well.. But that seems also good.. As long as you can have encryption and run your own server. It's not that I have anything to hide, but at the same time I'm tired of the infiltration of all states (which now also include EU).
Simplex doesn't support mutli-device. That's a deal breaker for me. I do 90% of my messaging at my desktop but also want to be able to chat on the go. Using my laptop on the couch is also fairly convenient.
No, it does not. The closest it comes is allowing a PC to take control of a mobile client on the same local network. That might be a convenient way to type with a full-sized keyboard if you have both devices in the same place, but it is not what people mean when talking about multi-device support.
GP wants the ability to use their account from multiple devices independently. From different locations, not tethered on a LAN. With shared message history, notifications, unread state, identity, etc. That's what multi-device support means in the context of messaging services.
There's also SimpleX chat and Briar, but I've used both of those less than Matrix. They seem to be aiming to solve the last few issues that Matrix has, like usernames and metadata leakage.
I consider Matrix to be closer to an "Enterprise" solution, like what a business or government or non-profit would use for secure communications (literally both French and German governments use Matrix), while SimpleX/Briar seem much more aimed at individuals just wanting control over their personal conversations.