Here's the first 2025 Jubilee report(, link and synthesis in the selftext)

There are a lot of books/articles, but it reminds me of these accusations from "The divide" by Jason Hickel :

‘Countries don’t go bust,’ as Citibank CEO Walter Wriston was fond of saying. This made good sense at the time – especially given that developmentalism was working and global South economies were soaring; no one thought they would have any difficulty repaying debts. So banks like Citibank, Chase, Deutsche Bank and others sent representatives jetting all around the global South to convince governments to take out big loans. They called this ‘go-go banking’, or ‘loan pushing’. Many of these loans were legitimate, of course. But in the midst of all the excitement, some banks got carried away. Loan pushers were trained to invent inflated projections of how beneficial the loans would be, manipulating statistics to convince governments to borrow even if they knew full well that they would never be able to repay. Pushers often focused specifically on dictatorships.
(...)
For loan pushers, what counted was not the quality of the loans, but their quantity. For each loan they sold, they made a handsome kickback in the form of so-called ‘participation fees’. (...) These kinds of incentives are known to be problematic. (...)
By 1982, total debt stocks had quadrupled, from $400 billion in 1970 to more than $1.6 trillion twelve years later. In many countries, debt levels reached well over 50 per cent of GDP. If the loans had been used to build productive capacity, this might have been all right. But because they were used largely to cover rising oil prices, the prospect of future repayment began to seem a pipe dream. To make matters worse, the terms of trade between global South countries and their Western counterparts were continuing to deteriorate; their raw material exports were worth less and less compared to the manufactured products they had to buy from abroad, so any income they might have used to repay debt was quickly diminishing.
(...)
The banks, meanwhile, were having a field day. Through the miracle of compound interest, they were raking in enormous profits – more than $100 billion per year by 1980.There was only one problem. The loans were denominated in US dollars, and the interest rates were variable. This meant that any significant rise in US interest rates would mean the interest rates on the loans would rise too, possibly pushing vulnerable poor countries into default. And that’s exactly what happened in 1981, when US Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker jacked interest rates up as high as 21 per cent. Poor countries found that they simply could not repay their loans at such high rates. In 1982, Mexico took the inevitable step and defaulted on part of its $80 billion debt. This move spurred other heavily indebted countries – such as Brazil and Argentina – to do the same, and set off what became known as the Third World Debt Crisis.
(...)
According to basic free-market theory, when a borrower defaults on a loan, the loss should be shouldered by the lender; after all, it was their risk to begin with. But Wall Street had so much invested in Third World debt they knew that they would be unable to absorb the losses, and would almost certainly collapse. They refused to let this happen. They set about convincing the US government to bail them out.
(...)
The US government stepped in to bail out the banks by forcing Mexico and other countries to repay their loans. They did this by repurposing the International Monetary Fund. The IMF was originally designed to use its own money to lend to countries with balance of payments problems, so that they could keep government spending up and therefore avoid another depression. It was John Maynard Keynes’s plan for making sure that the economy of the industrialised world stayed afloat during hard times. But now the G7 was going to use the IMF for a different purpose entirely: to force global South countries to stop government spending and use their money instead to repay loans to Western banks. In other words, the IMF came to act as a global debt enforcer – the equivalent of the bailiff who comes to repossess your car, only much more powerful. This radical shift in the mission of the IMF was only possible because during this period IMF leaders – such as managing director Jacques de Larosière – systematically purged the institution of people who supported the original Keynesian philosophy.
(...)
The real causes of the crisis were exogenous: they had to do with exorbitant interest rates and declining terms of trade, over which global South countries had no control. But the IMF had no intention of tackling these problems (...) The crisis was simply an excuse for rolling out an economic agenda that Washington had long been seeking to impose.
(...)
From the 1950s through the 1970s, Western powers had struggled to prevent the rise of developmentalism in the South. What they failed to accomplish through piecemeal coups and covert intervention, the debt crisis did for them in one fell swoop.
The SAPs pushed the very same policies that the Chicago School had tested out in Chile, but instead of being imposed through violence, they were imposed by leveraging debt (...) and without the embarrassing inconvenience of dictators and torture chambers. The brilliance of structural adjustment is that it seemed as though it was voluntary – as though global South countries chose to accept the programmes in order to get out from under their debt.

It's not his only explanation, after all nationalism and humanism are mutually exclusive.

Between 1973 and 1993, global South debt grew from $100 billion to $1.5 trillion. Of the $1.5 trillion, only $400 billion was actually borrowed money. The rest was piled up simply as a result of compound interest.

Perhaps ignorant and out-of-topic, but that's a fcking waste of money i.m.o. :

Almost 3 trillion, every year.