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How do we know that governments don't just have a secret hardware backdoor in all our devices?

Edit: Changed "the government" to "governments"

I mean, people say use end to end encryption, VPN, Tor, Open Source Operating System, but I think one thing missed is the hardware is not really open source, and theres no practical open source alternative for hardware. There's Intel ME, AMD PSP, so there's probably one in phones. How can people be so confident these encryption is gonna stop intelligence agencies?

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  • It's difficult to know that for sure, which is why (e.g.) the US government wants to make sure that there is domestic chip manufacture with a completely controlled supply chain to make hardware for classified communications. It can help to consider the difference between targeted surveillance (spending millions to tap the President's phone, to get big juicy national secrets) and dragnet surveillance (tapping everybody's phone so that you can have dirt on Joe Schmoe if he does something interesting later, even if he is of no particular interest right now). Hardware backdoors would be used mostly for targeted surveillance.

    Stuff like VPN's and encrypted apps can be of considerable help against dragnet surveillance, which is what the civil privacy community mostly cares about. If you think you might be a subject of targeted surveillance, you have to be much more paranoid. Not just hardware backdoors in your computer, but suspicious white vans on your street, microphones in your flower pots, FBI agents under your bed, the whole bit.

    There are some countermeasures you can take against hardware backdoors (electromagnetically isolate a computer from the network and transfer data from it by floppy disc or similar) but basically you're in a different world if you're dealing with this.

    You mght like the book "Security Engineering" by Ross Anderson (older editions free online and still very good: https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/archive/rja14/book.html and scroll down). It goes into this stuff, has lots of good overviews even if you gloss over the technical parts, and will generally help you see clearly in the topic.

  • I mean we pretty much can be certain that we're all being surveilled to some extent all the time.

  • ‘They’ (I.e. government agencies/PPP) actively exploit weaknesses or institutionally create them. Personal favorite is the backdoors built into TETRA, which is used for mainly government purposes (law enforcement, emergency services). ETSI acts as a strawman for government interest and serves no cause other than that of its masters. That bugs me to no end because this does not serve any purpose.

    https://www.zetter-zeroday.com/interview-with-the-etsi-standards/

  • You need to think about what a backdoor looks like for different devices, and different functions of that device. "Backdoor" generally means a way to bypass security measures, but that entails can vary wildly in different contexts. For some things you can know because you can check to see if the hardware is doing what's expected because the only meaningful backdoor would be local to the hardware.
    For example, hardware based encryption systems can have their outputs compared against a trusted implementation of the same algorithm.

    For cases where there isn't an objective source of truth for "proper functioning", or where complex inputs are accepted and either produce a simple answer (access granted/denied), or a complex behavior (logging login attempts and network calls are always expected) it can be harder to the point of impossibility to know that what's being done is correct.
    This is also the case for bugs, so it can actually be unclear if something is a backdoor or an error.
    "Any sufficiently hair brained programming error is indistinguishable from an attack by a nation state threat actor". (the goto fail bug is a great example of this. extremely dumb error every programmer has made, or a very well executed and sophisticated attack.

    Ultimately, any system can be compromised by a sufficiently determined attacker. Security cannot be perfect, because at some point you need to trust someone.
    The key is to decide how much you trust each system to handle whatever you need it to handle.
    I trust my phone's manufacturer as much or more than I trust the network provider. If I'm doing something naughty the person I'm communicating with getting snagged leads to me via the network and their device without needing to compromise my hardware. I choose to focus on the weak link: the people I talk with who might be unable to properly conduct a criminal conspiracy, and getting them up to speed.

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