Bulletins and News Discussion from February 26th to March 3rd, 2024 - Breaking The Siege Of Omdurman - COTW: Sudan
The war in Sudan has so far been marked by a lot of incompetency and mismanagement by government forces (the SAF). After months of bitter fighting, in late 2023, the opposing Rapid Support Forces suddenly expanded their control towards the southeast of Khartoum after not a lot of resistance, most notably taking the city of Wad Madani. This led the SAF supporters and officials to panic and point fingers at each other about what the hell the army is even doing, while RSF soldiers looted the city.
These victories led to a short period in late December and early January where diplomacy and peace talks were considered, but such attempts fell apart. The leader of the RSF visited various African countries, including meeting Paul Kagame in Rwanda, to boost his legitimacy. Then, the RSF attacked into South Kordofan and consolidated their hold on other areas.
The Sudanese capital of Khartoum sits on a river which divides it from the city to its west, Omdurman (see the post image). The SAF and RSF have been fighting over this grand urban area for the whole war, with the RSF holding most of Khartoum (with an entirely cut-off SAF force holding on in the center), with a similarly cut-off SAF force also in eastern Omdurman, up against the river. For 10 months, this force has been under siege - but no longer. In perhaps the first actual W of the war for the SAF, they finally managed to break the siege a week ago, pouring supplies in. This leaves a section of the RSF now cut off, though Omdurman is still not under full SAF control (and, who knows, the whole situation could once again go badly for the SAF).
Meanwhile, the Sudanese socioeconomic situation has completely collapsed, with potentially a 20% fall in GDP and 8 million people displaced, with 2 million from Khartoum alone. 18 million Sudanese, or about a third of the population, is in acute hunger, and 20 million children are out in school. The refugees streaming out of the country are causing knock-on effects in neighorboring countries like Chad. Nobody is even really counting the dead anymore.
Red is the government forces, the SAF. Blue is the RSF opposition. Other colours are various factions.
The Country of the Week is Sudan! Feel free to chime in with books, essays, longform articles, even stories and anecdotes or rants. More detail here.
Defense Politics Asia's youtube channel and their map. Their youtube channel has substantially diminished in quality but the map is still useful.
Moon of Alabama, which tends to have interesting analysis. Avoid the comment section. Understanding War and the Saker: reactionary sources that have occasional insights on the war. Alexander Mercouris, who does daily videos on the conflict. While he is a reactionary and surrounds himself with likeminded people, his daily update videos are relatively brainworm-free and good if you don't want to follow Russian telegram channels to get news. He also co-hosts The Duran, which is more explicitly conservative, racist, sexist, transphobic, anti-communist, etc when guests are invited on, but is just about tolerable when it's just the two of them if you want a little more analysis.
On the ground: Patrick Lancaster, an independent and very good journalist reporting in the warzone on the separatists' side.
Unedited videos of Russian/Ukrainian press conferences and speeches.
Pro-Russian Telegram Channels:
Again, CW for anti-LGBT and racist, sexist, etc speech, as well as combat footage.
https://t.me/aleksandr_skif ~ DPR's former Defense Minister and Colonel in the DPR's forces. Russian language. https://t.me/Slavyangrad ~ A few different pro-Russian people gather frequent content for this channel (~100 posts per day), some socialist, but all socially reactionary. If you can only tolerate using one Russian telegram channel, I would recommend this one. https://t.me/s/levigodman ~ Does daily update posts. https://t.me/patricklancasternewstoday ~ Patrick Lancaster's telegram channel. https://t.me/gonzowarr ~ A big Russian commentator. https://t.me/rybar ~ One of, if not the, biggest Russian telegram channels focussing on the war out there. Actually quite balanced, maybe even pessimistic about Russia. Produces interesting and useful maps. https://t.me/epoddubny ~ Russian language. https://t.me/boris_rozhin ~ Russian language. https://t.me/mod_russia_en ~ Russian Ministry of Defense. Does daily, if rather bland updates on the number of Ukrainians killed, etc. The figures appear to be approximately accurate; if you want, reduce all numbers by 25% as a 'propaganda tax', if you don't believe them. Does not cover everything, for obvious reasons, and virtually never details Russian losses. https://t.me/UkraineHumanRightsAbuses ~ Pro-Russian, documents abuses that Ukraine commits.
The article's a little too long to quote in full so I'll be picking the most important parts out.
Against the backdrop of the widening, US-backed and armed Israeli war on Gaza, the US airstrikes against Iraq and Syria were meant to deliver a strong message of deterrence to Iran's allies in the Axis of Resistance, who are targeting US military interests in West Asia in response to the carnage in Gaza. But the strikes have instead served mainly to embarrass the Iraqi government and its domestic allies, prompting a reevaluation of the country’s relationship with Washington and reviving calls for an end to the US military presence in Iraq.
Despite a steady stream of US threats and intimidation tactics employed to deter the Iraqi resistance since late last year, these factions have incrementally increased and expanded their engagement in the region-wide war, driven by their commitment to the Palestinian resistance and its liberation goals. The Iraqi groups have a specific goal: pressure Washington until it forces a Gaza truce – a strategic target that reflects the unity of purpose among the resistance factions in Iraq and the region.
...In Iraq’s case, the greatest military burden was assumed by four of the resistance factions identified by Kataib Hezbollah Secretary General Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi: his own group Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, and Ansarallah al-Aufiaa. As one IRI official tells The Cradle: "The fronts are opened at the discretion of the leaders (of these groups) themselves, based on religious, ideological, and moral commitments stemming from the nature of the Iraqi character in the first place."
Over the past few months, the IRI has demonstrated its versatility by employing a variety of tactics and weaponry in around 188 separate military operations against US targets. These range from missile strikes on US bases in Iraq to drone attacks against US occupation forces in Syria, and even include the targeting of distant Israeli territories such as Ashdod, Haifa, and the occupied Golan Heights. An official source in the IRI confirms to The Cradle that "We bombed with ballistic missiles American bases, even those in Iraq, and this was not limited to distant targets in the depth, or in the occupied territory."
However, as tensions escalated, strains in the relationship between Baghdad and Washington became palpable. The Iraqi government found itself caught between the embarrassment of complicity and the challenge of maintaining control over security affairs. Even some of the resistance factions themselves felt the squeeze of external pressures, notably Kataib Hezbollah, who on 31 January announced a temporary suspension of operations against US forces and Israeli targets. The halt came in the immediate aftermath of the killing of three US soldiers in Tower 22 along the Jordanian-Syrian border, in an Iraqi resistance operation unprecedented in its depth which was viewed as a direct challenge to Washington's perceived invincibility. As expected, the operation caused a spike in tensions, causing some ferocious shuttle diplomacy in the following days and provoking a strong, disproportionate US military response.
For factions like Kataib Hezbollah and Al-Nujaba, the decision to suspend operations was a calculated move to gauge Washington's response. Yet, the US military's targeted assassination of Kataib Hezbollah commander Abu Baqir al-Saadi caught them off guard, eliciting a sharp condemnation of the US attack from Baghdad. Saadi’s faction, it should be noted, is part of the Popular Mobilization Units that defeated ISIS, and is therefore under the umbrella of the Iraqi armed forces. This time, the Iraqi government had no choice but to side with the resistance, while the IRI issued a stern warning to the US in which it signaled a return to operations.
...What cannot be ignored, however, is that these diplomatic initiatives followed a series of coercive measures by the US Treasury to diminish the value of the Iraqi dinar against the US dollar. While Iraq - both officially and among its various political factions - insists that leveraging the volume of Iraqi oil exports as a bargaining chip in the global market is an ineffective negotiating tool, there are those who anticipate seizing the opportunity of market scarcity to increase their share by two million barrels. Sudani mission is a difficult one. He must hammer out a solution that fulfills his government's commitment to remove foreign military forces forces from Iraqi soil without triggering negative US repercussions.
According to leaks, the Iraqi prime minister reportedly reached an agreement with the IRI to suspend its military operations against US bases in order to facilitate his negotiations for the complete withdrawal of international coalition forces from Iraq. Yet, any decision in this regard risks eliciting a negative response from Washington, which brandishes an ever-present arsenal of pressure tactics. This is particularly concerning given that Iraqi oil revenues are still required to pass through the US Federal Bank before being released to Baghdad. Members of the Iraqi Council of Representatives are actively working to proceed with a law to remove foreign forces from Iraq, with majority representation from Shia-dominated central and southern Iraq. However, Sunni factions remain ambiguous in their stance toward the coordination framework blocs' efforts to enact such legislation. In addition, Kurdish parties, notably the Kurdistan Democratic Party, vehemently oppose any consideration of US military withdrawal from Iraq.
In response to these dynamics, the Russian Foreign Ministry has expressed Moscow's willingness to bolster Iraqi forces following the departure of unwanted foreign troops. The Russian offer has compounded the pressure on Washington, prompting a reassessment of the waning US strategic position in West Asia.
In West Asia, the bedrock of US power projection lies in its strategically located military bases nestled within the Persian Gulf. However, the future of these vital installations appears increasingly uncertain as geopolitical alliances shift toward multipolarity, hastened by the multi-front war unfolding in the region. The fallout from Israel's brutal military assault on Gaza and unconditional US support for it are accelerating these shifts. Traditional allies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE – once steadfast in their partnership with Washington – are now charting more independent courses, cautiously avoiding entanglements that could lead to broader conflicts, particularly with Iran and its Axis of Resistance allies.
Indeed, this recalibration, coupled with the Persian Gulf states' concerted efforts toward economic diversification beyond oil, is gradually eroding the sturdy foundations of long-standing partnerships. The question now is how these shifts will affect US military presence in the region and the ability of Americans to operate from their established bases.